

DD/P_3:62

4 February 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT:

Planning for Possible Acceptance by CHIANG Kai-shek of Chinese Communist

Offers to be Vice Premier

REFERENCES:

- A. Memorandum, subject as stated above, to the DCI from Inspector General, dated 3 January 1957
- Memorandum, subject as stated above, to the DCI from Assistant Director, National Estimates, dated 17 January 1957
- This memorandum is for your information.
- 2. The Far East Division concurs with the conclusions reached by the Assistant Director, National Estimates, in reference B.
- 3. To support his views, the Assistant Director, National Estimates, notes in paragraph 1 of reference B the following quotation

"so long as President CHIANG remains in power no substantial change in Nationalist policy is likely to occur."

The Far East Division concurs insofar as this statement applies to Communist China. However, should any third country (including the USA) change its policy toward Communist China, the Nationalist Government would be expected to change its policy toward that country.

> NO CHANGE IN CLASS. | ☐ DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DAYE! AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: 25 MAR

REVIEWER:

DOCUMENT NO.

25X1

- 4. The Far East Division is endeavouring to assist the U. S. Government intelligence community in its estimates of political conditions on Taiwan by:
 - a. An intensive political action program designed to win the confidence of high officials of the Nationalist Government and thus influence their attitudes toward international events;

b. The initiation of monthly estimates of political conditions on Taiwan to be originated by senior personnel	7
	25X1
	25X1
CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION	

SEGRET

RO	UTING	AND	RECOR	RD SHEET FE-2260
JBJECT: (Optional)		 		
POM:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	NO.
CFE				DATE 29 March 1957
); (Officer designation, room number, and ilding)	DA	\TE	OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
1. 1050	REC'D	FWD'D	INITIALS	to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.
DD/P	MR 29 57			CONCURRENCE
2.			1	
3.	4/		0	
DDCI	4/2		cfc	
5. TAT				
DCI 6.				APPROVAL
7.				
3.		•		
).				
0.				
1.				
2				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				

. Fo	UTING	S AND	RECO	RD SHEET FE-1841
UBJECT: (Optional)				7 701
MEMORAN)	DUM	<u>-</u>		
.com:				NO.
F E				DATE STAT
O: (Officer designation, room number, and illding)		DATE	OFFICER'S	4 February 1957
	REC'D	FWD'D	INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.
		4FEB		STAT
	 			·
•				
•			-	
ACFE/2		4 FEB		
	<u> </u>			
•				
CFE				for signature
				,
FE/ESEC		F/Er		
				·
	EB 6 '57			
DD/P	LEB O .			J
1.	1/2	7/2		
DDCI	1/130	,	kn	copy pulled
DCI				
				het
ER .				
1.				
5.				

Approved For Release 2006/08/02 : CIA-RDP80R01731R086700500019-4

UNCLASSIFIED

STAT

RDF80R01731R00 Approved For Release 2006/08/02 Co

17 January 1957

zecutive Pegiatr

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT:

Comment on "Planning for Possible Acceptance

by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offer

to be Vice Premier"

REFERENCE:

Memorandum, subject as above, to DCI from

Inspector General, dated 3 January 1957

1. We believe that Chiang Kai-shek himself would not respond favorably to any invitation to assume a position in the Chinese Communist regime. Chiang considers himself and the National Government as the guardians of traditional Chinese culture and traditions and we believe that his anti-Communist attitudes are so deeply rooted that he would not accommodate to Pei'ping even in the face of the desertion of his principal subordinates. This view of Chiang's position is implicit in the statement in NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China", published 9 October 1956, that "so long as President Chiang remains in power no substantial change in Nationalist policy is likely to occur." We have received no intelligence tending to alter this view.

MORI/CDF This Page

- 2. Chou En-lai's public statements about a position in the Pei'ping regime for Chiang Kai-shek were almost certainly made in order to stimulate doubt and uncertainty in lower levels on Taiwan, rather than with any expectation of subverting Chiang. The Chinese Communists have been attempting for at least two years to subvert individuals and groups at all levels on Taiwan, and we share the concern expressed in the referenced memorandum both as to the possibility of success of these Communist efforts and our lack of information on the success or failure of the Communist effort to date. In NIE 43-56 the intelligence community agreed that "If Communist China continues its peaceful pose, avoids serious internal tensions, continues to make substantial domestic economic progress, and attains increased international recognition, an increasing number of mainland Chinese on Taiwan will be conditioned to look more favorably upon the Communist regime and upon the possibility of reaching some accommodation with it."
- 3. We have indicated our concern in this matter both in direct communication with FE/PP and through the post-mortems

- 2 -

MORI/CDF This Page

to the NIE's on Taiwan. Our post mortem to NIE 43-55, dated

15 November 1955, stated that "Our estimates on Taiwan could
be strengthened by fuller and more specific information on the
extent and nature of Communist subversive efforts, the effectiveness of Nationalist counterintelligence, and by more positive
information on the state of civilian morale on Taiwan, especially
among officials." In the post mortem to NIE 43-56, dated 10
October 1956, the intelligence community agreed that we need
more information on "the effect of Chinese Communist propaganda
directed toward Taiwan and individuals on Taiwan."

4. We understand that a concerted effort is underway on Taiwan to develop capabilities to obtain from controlled sources the type of information discussed above and in the referenced memorandum. In the meantime we agree with the referenced memorandum that collection requirements should be kept under review. In view of our lack of solid information concerning attitudes of top Nationalist leaders, contingency planning to cover the possibility of high level defections and serious unrest on Taiwan should receive some priority; although we believe the defection of Chiang

MORI/CDF This Page

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/08/02: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700500019-4

himself most unlikely, we would not recommend barring such a development from contingency planning.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

25X1

SHERMAN KENT Assistant Director National Estimates

MORI/CDF This Page

- 4 -



:		<u>.</u>	TE 10 11	
App	proved For Refease 2	ENER 68/02/SEGIONALIZ	KSFB04/2 175990 /00500019-4	
		CONFIDE	ENTIAL	
	CEI	NTRAL INTELLIGENCE	AGENCY . A	
	OFF	ICIAL ROUTIN	G SLIP By to 1	
	TO NAME A	ND ADDRESS	INITIALS DATE	
	1 MR. KIRKI	ATRICV		
		AIRIUN	31 Jan.	25
	2		₹10€	20
	3	719	- a (yan,	25
	NAL	7//	EB 1 0	25
	4	FF L	814	2.0
	5 PE/2	F 17459		
1	1012			
	6 DE/			
. [ACTION	DIRECT REPLY		
}	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	PREPARE REPLY	
ľ	COMMENT	FILE	RECOMMENDATION RETURN	
' t	CONCORRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Γ	Remarks:			
	Pls see Direc comment".	tor's note "to	note and	
	No com	nend. Belin	eve they	
	ENE Z	7] Jack	25
104	Justense > Fe	((L)		
104	Jupluse 7 Fe FOLD HE	RETO RETURN TO SE	NDER	
104	FROM: NAME AD	RE TO RETURN TO SE		2.5
101	AL AL	DRESS AND PHONE NO.	NDER DATE	25
104	AL AL	RE TO RETURN TO SEL DORESS AND PHONE NO. 22 Jan 57	DATE	25

Approved For Release 2006/08/02: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700500019-4

Approve	r For Releas	e 2006/08/02 p⊊EA-RDP80R01731R000700500019-4
	то:	FE/2
1 • •	ROOM NO.	BUILDING
	Ols	note suspense. FE date is
	date	. FE date is
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	61-	-eb-togue time
	bg	Feb.
	7	Feb.
1	FROM:	
	ROOM NO.	BUILDING EXTENSION

STAT

FORM NO 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. CIA-RDP80R01731R000700500019-4